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 Two legal families central to the discussion of the relationship between the rule of 
law and economic development are English common law and continental civil law—in 
particular, French civil law. An overview of these two families is warranted at the outset, 
if only to indicate what the concept of legal origins as a determinant of economic 
development entails. 
  
Common Law 
 When William conquered England in 1066, he set in train a flow of events that 
eventually divided today’s Western world between common law and civil law countries. 
At that time the Roman law system that had distinguished the Roman empire no longer 
held sway in western Europe, where law was local or at best regional. In the Eastern 
                                                 
α The author would the John M. Olin Foundation, the Law and Economics Program at the University 
of Chicago Law School, and The Brookings Institution for research assistance, together with Wonbin 
Kang, his research assistant at the University of Chicago Law School and Rebecca Vichniac and Heather 
Milkewicz, his research assistants at Brookings. This working paper was written in preparation for a 
forthcoming book length study, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic Development, to 
be published in late 2006 by the Brookings Institution Press (see  
http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/lawgrowthnexus.htm).  
This working paper is best read as an introduction to the following previously posted working papers 
that discuss the relevance of the concept of legal origins to specific contemporary issues of economic 
development. (1) "Institutions, History, and Economic Development," U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin 
Working Paper No. 271 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=875026 (2) "The Judiciary and 
Economic Development," U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 287 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=892030 (3) "Land, Law and Economic Development," U Chicago Law & 
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Markets, the Corporation and Economic Development," U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working 
Paper No. 280 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885196; (5) "Credit Markets, Creditors' Rights 
and Economic Development," U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 281 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885198 and (6)"China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for 
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empire, Roman law had been written down. But in the West the empire centered in Rome 
had already collapsed, and so the law was a series of customs, often unwritten, that varied 
from place to place. 
William was crowned King of England in Westminster on Christmas Day 1066, 
and in the space of a few decades he and his successors and their officials had imposed 
Norman law, effectively displacing the existing Saxon law. The new English kings 
gradually established a bureaucracy complete with its own law and courts as well as a 
feudal system, based on Norman custom, for the holding of land.1 Carrying out a promise 
to his key supporters, William seized the land of his Saxon opponents and divided it 
among his most important followers. Under the system he established in England, based 
on the continental feudal system, all land was ultimately held by those who actually 
worked the land in a chain of ownership leading back to the king.2 In the early days 
English common law was largely a law of real property.3 Vestiges of the adaptation of 
the common law to its feudal heritage are found in common law countries to this day.  
The new court system, centered in London, began using traveling royal judges to 
cover the country, thereby ensuring a unified common law for all of England that left 
only a minor role for local custom.4 The quick consolidation of law—a common law for 
all of England—was remarkable.5 A leading German comparative law text notes that 
France did not achieve any comparable common legal rules until the sixteenth century 
and Germany did not do so before the nineteenth century. Consequently, the text authors 
point out that “there never existed in England one of the essential motor powers behind 
the idea of codification, which even on the Continent rested on the practical need to unify 
the law as well as on the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the thinking of natural 
                                                                                                                                                 
Economic Growth?" U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 275 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880125 . 
1. Van Caenegem (1988, pp. 96–97).  
2. Holdsworth (1956, pp. 17–32).  
3. Holdsworth (1909, p. 204). 
4. Von Mehren, Taylor, and Gordley (1977, pp. 12–13); Danziger and Gillingham (2003, p. 179).  
The Magna Carta required the royal courts to be held “in a certain place,” which could be Westminster 
(Hudson 1996, p. 224). Itinerant judges were nonetheless still sent out about the country, with important 
cases referred back to Westminster, thereby preserving the uniformity of the law (Dawson 1968, p. 6, n. 
11).  
5. Common law, in its core meaning, “applies throughout the realm” and is “territorial, applying to 
people because they are within the realm, in contrast with a system of ‘personal’ law, where a person’s 
nationality determines the type of law to which he or she is subject” (Hudson 1996, pp. 16–18).  
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lawyers.”6  
Substantive English law, being nevertheless customary (albeit at root Norman 
custom), was not written down in a comprehensive way. Rather it was based on a series 
of writs (that is, writings) that were “forms of action,” one for each of the multitude of 
law proceedings that a plaintiff might wish to bring. But each writ presumed a particular 
wrong and a particular remedy, and it was up to the plaintiff to choose the right one on 
pain of having his remedy denied.7 These forms of action also lingered in English law 
until legal reform finally eliminated most of the last vestiges in the twentieth century. 
The writs, though in writing, were not themselves statements of substantive law, 
and indeed the substantive law of England cannot be said to have been written down until 
the publication of the treatise known as Bracton.8 But even though its author or authors, 
knew some Roman law and were influenced by it, the book was explicitly based on court 
records, thereby recognizing a central principle of the common law that the law is at base 
what the judges say it is.9 New writs were regularly being invented to meet new felt 
needs, statutes were occasionally passed, and the king’s imposition of the feudal land 
system was in effect creating law, but common law techniques of finding and extending 
law had not yet developed.10   
Later, common law judges began to elaborate on their rulings with written 
opinions. These opinions, which sought their justification in earlier cases, began to create 
the distinctive approach of the common law that characterizes it even today. This 
approach treats formerly decided cases as controlling precedent and requires judges to 
reason from case to case, distinguishing cases that could be said to be conflicting 
precedents, in order to find the controlling principles for new fact situations. It is this 
process of reasoning from case to case that is what most people today think of as the 
essence of the common law.  Indeed, today the words common law are usually taken to 
mean judge-made law, rather than just unified law.  
To be sure, the English parliament began to pass important statutes, but they were 
                                                 
6. Zweigert and Kötz (1992, p. 191).  
7. Milsom (1969, pp. 22–32).  
8. Some scholarship raises doubts about how much of the book Henry de Bracton actually wrote; see 
Tierney (1963).  
9. Dawson (1968, p. 2).  
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regarded for some centuries, at least by some judges, as embellishments to the body of 
common law. Indeed, it was understood that statutes that contravened the common law 
rule were to be narrowly construed to avoid changing more than parliament had clearly 
intended. But in time it became customary that statutes had their own independent status, 
independent of the common law, and that statutes could even change common law rules. 
Nonetheless, judges used methods of interpreting ambiguities in statutes that echoed their 
methods in nonstatutory fields. In particular, judges relied on earlier decisions on the 
interpretation of a particular statute and generally considered these earlier rulings as 
binding on later courts. These characteristics, which are recognized even today by every 
beginning law student in common law countries as the common law method, can be 
contrasted with the civil law system that came to reign on the  European continent.   
 
Civil Law 
 The civil law system developed only slowly. In the early centuries of the common 
law, continental western Europe was still divided among the remnants of the Roman 
empire, with customary local law still governing issues involving land, contracts, torts, 
and the like. This remained true even with the rising importance of the Holy Roman 
Empire, which exercised little of the sovereign power that is normally associated with 
law, that power remaining in the various kingdoms and principalities within the Holy 
Roman Empire. 
Nonetheless, over the centuries interest grew in continental western Europe in 
Roman law, leading to what was known as the “reception” of Roman law. This reception 
occurred predominantly in the German-speaking areas of Europe (which was the territory 
where the Holy Roman Empire of the German Peoples, as it was called, had its primary 
influence). But Roman law remains to this date an important influence on the law of, for 
example, Scotland. 
The interest in Roman law led to a situation in which its concepts and procedures 
were overlaid on local traditions, being especially influential in areas such as contracts 
and torts. Law still varied from place to place, but students were increasingly taught 
                                                                                                                                                 
10. Hamowy (2003, p. 249) states that more than 470 writs had been created by the end of the reign of 
Henry II, but that the creation of new writs “had stopped altogether” by the end of the fourteenth century 
because by that time “common law judges opposed the issuance of writs that had no precedent.”  
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Roman law; hence, a sense of continuity and unity grew in what became known as the jus 
commune—a kind of common law at least for German-speaking parts of the continent 
(though quite different from the common law of England).11 Curiously the Roman law 
texts were those collected in the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Eastern emperor Justinian I in 
the sixth century, after the collapse of the Western empire. The split between the 
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation states and the rise of nationalism led to 
national codifications, the first in Denmark in 1683. By the time Napoleon came to power 
in France in 1799, the codification movement was well advanced. Napoleon set out to 
promulgate the codification of all codifications, the French Civil Code, which went into 
effect in 1804. 
Napoleon took a great interest in his code. He personally chaired many of the 
meetings of the consul committee reviewing the work of the drafters. No doubt 
Napoleon, the man of action, insisted on the practicality of the code and perhaps its 
clarity and simplicity.12 He certainly was proud of his work; after the defeat at Waterloo, 
he proclaimed: “My true glory is not that I have won 40 battles; Waterloo will blow away 
the memory of those victories. What nothing can blow away, what will live eternally is 
my civil code.”13 That was perhaps why Napoleon wanted the code understandable by 
the common man. But it was drafted by professors and reflected their approach, rather 
than that of men of practical affairs, and certainly not that of merchants.14 
Being the product of professors, the French Civil Code was abstract, reflecting the 
“abstract reasoning [that] had characterized the French approach to law and to life in 
general” during the Age of Reason. But its generality and it emphasis on 
understandability meant that one had often to take into account a variety of provisions to 
determine the legal rules covering a given set of facts. Its very generality gave it staying 
power, with no important changes made until 1880 (except for the repeal of divorce in 
1816 after the Catholic monarchy was restored).15  And indeed even today the core 
provisions of Napoleon’s code remain in place despite increasingly numerous statutory 
                                                 
11. Rheinstein and Glendon (2003).  
12. Zweigert and Kötz (1998, p. 83); Rabel (1949-1950a, pp. 107–8).  
13. Quoted in Aucoin (2002).  
14. See Aucoin (2002) and Merryman (1985, p. 56).  
15. Rheinstein and Glendon (2003). 
Legal Institutions 
 
6 
changes. No doubt it was its generality and clarity of language16—Napoleon’s army and 
French imperialism aside—that made the French Civil Code so influential in much of the 
nineteenth century world that is spoken of today as the developing world. Alan Watson 
has made the point that when countries choose the law of another country, the prestige of 
the legal system under consideration counts.17 No doubt about it, the French Civil Code 
was prestigious. 
The French Civil Code contrasts nicely with the German Civil Code, which came 
almost a century later in 1900. Why was the German Civil Code so different? Some 
would say that the explanation lies in the difference in the style of thinking in the two 
countries, but history played a big role. It was in the German-speaking territories that the 
greatest “reception” of Roman law occurred. This is not to say that Roman law did not 
have a major influence on the French Civil Code, but the influence in France was for a 
different reason than its influence in Germany. One of the reasons Napoleon wanted a 
code was to unify the law of southern and northern France. Whereas the law in the north 
was customary law, the law in the south, derived from Roman law, was already written 
down (droit ecrit).18  
In contrast, a major form of German legal scholarship in the decades between the 
adoption of the two codes was devoted to the study of Roman law. Out of that strain of 
scholarship came a group of law scholars, the Pandectists, who devoted themselves over 
some decades to the elaboration of a German civil code.19 The style of that code is quite 
different from the French code. In contrast to the French Civil Code, which was written 
to be understandable by a moderately literate Frenchman, no one would expect the 
ordinary German to read the German code, much less understand it. Concepts are 
carefully defined in the German code, and any given legal term is used in the same way 
throughout the entire code.20  
                                                 
16. Rabel (1949–50a, p. 109). 
17. Watson (1977, pp. 98–99).  
18. Zweigert and Kötz (1998, pp. 77–82) and Jolowicz (1982, p. 89)  
19. Dawson (1968, pp. 450–61). 
20. Ernst Rabel, the foremost comparative law scholar of his generation, held a set of lectures in his 
new home in the United States after leaving Germany, in which he was unsparing in his comparison of the 
French and German civil codes. On the question of style, he described the French Civil Code: “The 
language, crystalline and beautiful, has not had its equal before or afterward; there have been celebrated 
French poets who like to read some chapters for encouragement in prose” (Rabel 1949–50a, p. 109). For 
the German code, he reserved pejorative descriptions: “ponderous,” “overaccurate pedantry,” “innumerable 
wheels and gadgets,” and “ugly” (Rabel 1949–50b, pp. 270, 275). 
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 For the purposes of considering contemporary economic development issues in 
this book, the bulk of our attention on the influence of civil law can be focused largely on 
the French Civil Code. We can do so for quite pragmatic reasons. Putting aside the 
transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, few developing 
countries are influenced by German law, and those few—such as South Korea and 
Taiwan—are already high-income countries. (Of course, South Korea and Taiwan had 
much lower incomes just a few decades ago and thus their legal development would 
merit investigation.) Scandinavian countries had a few colonies, but today no developing 
country is regarded as being part of the Scandinavian legal family. The dominant 
influence in private law (as opposed to, say, constitutional law) in the great bulk of 
today’s less developed world came from either English common law or French civil 
law.21  
 
Legal Origins as a Theory of Development 
 The essence of the legal origins approach, as applied to economic development, is 
to use regressions to show that the origin—say, English common law or French civil 
law—of a particular country’s law is associated with that country’s rate of economic 
growth. An alternative approach to the relevance of legal institutions to a country’s 
economic growth looks at the role of “governance.” It includes an important role for the 
rule of law in overall governance. The two approaches complement each other, and I take 
up the governance approach below as a useful contrast to the legal origins approach.   
Most of the legal origins work began in finance. An early, and perhaps still the 
most influential, legal origins article is “Law and Finance,” published in 1998 by four 
economists—Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny—whose work has become so well known that they are universally cited as 
LLSV.22 Even though the four authors did not set out to apply their work to economic 
development policies, it has often been interpreted as throwing important light on 
economic development outcomes.  
Building on earlier work showing that stronger financial sectors led to more rapid 
                                                 
21. The statement in the text ignores China, which was never a colony and never felt the need to adopt 
Western law, as did Japan in the late nineteenth century, at least in part. 
22. La Porta and others (1998).  
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economic growth in the economy as a whole, LLSV used a sample of forty-nine countries 
to show a statistical relationship between the character of legal rules concerning the 
financial sector and the origin of a country’s laws. 23 The most interesting part of this 
body of research was its finding that countries whose law derived from the common law 
had stronger legal systems for financial development and hence faster economic growth 
than civil law countries. An obvious conclusion was that the common law provided a 
superior legal base for a country (and this was true whether new countries received their 
law through conquest or colonization).  
Equally striking was the finding that French law was the worst among civil law 
systems for the development of the financial sector and that German and Scandinavian 
legal systems were situated between common law and French legal systems. And in a 
related 1997 article, “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” (which was based on the 
same research involving the same countries), LLSV showed that common law origin 
countries had grown faster than French origin countries—4.30 percent per capita versus 
3.18 percent.24 
 In their “Law and Finance” article, La Porta and his colleagues looked at 
“enforcement variables” such as the “efficiency of legal system,” “rule of law,” and so 
forth. But mostly they looked at substantive legal provisions, particularly rules 
concerning the protection of shareholders and creditors, finding that the common law 
countries offered the most protections, followed by the German and Scandinavian law 
countries, with French law countries trailing. The main body of their work was in the 
financial sector, raising perhaps a systemic issue about the policy implications of the 
legal origin work (important as the financial sector undeniably is to growth, particularly 
in the middle-income countries). Indeed, an oddity of their work on the financial sector 
was that it concerned primarily the protection of minority shareholders under corporate 
law and the protection of creditors in bankruptcy law. Yet both corporate and bankruptcy 
law are legal areas where most countries—common law and civil law countries alike—
rely on statutory law, much of it quite recent, rather than judge-made common law or 
                                                 
23. Levine (2004) reviews the considerable research, dating back to the early 1990s, showing a causal 
link running from financial development to economic growth. See also Beck, Demirgûç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2004), who find that “financial development reduces income inequality by disproportionately boosting the 
incomes of the poor.” 
24. La Porta and others (1997, p. 1138, table II).  
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nineteenth century civil law codes.25 This circumstance raises serious questions about the 
leading interpretation of their results to the effect that the common law method of judge-
made laws is superior to legislative enactments in building stronger financial sectors and 
hence in enhancing economic growth.26 
 In 2000 LLSV followed up with another article, which referred to their earlier 
work and to new work by other economists. Summarizing those works, they said that “an 
exogenous component of financial market development, obtained by using legal origin as 
an instrument, predicts economic growth.” 27  They therefore reached the policy 
conclusion that “the evidence on the importance of the historically determined legal 
origin in shaping investor rights … suggests at least tentatively that many rules need to 
be changed simultaneously to bring a country with poor investor protection up to best 
practice.”28  
 A different approach is to be found in an article by Mahoney, who rejected the 
notion that the prime influence of legal origin on economic growth was through financial 
development. He favored an explanation concerning the greater role for the state relative 
to the individual citizen in French law. Mahoney explicitly tested the relation of legal 
origin to economic growth, finding that common law countries grow at least 0.7 percent 
faster than civil law countries.29 
A short narrative version of the legal origins theory, which generates the 
dominant view of the superiority of the common law, is that France under Napoleon 
adopted elegant civil and commercial codes at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
which became the base for the legal systems of much of southern Europe (Napoleon 
made sure of that through his armies) and later for French Africa and, derivatively 
through Spain and Portugal, for Latin America. Thus, if those African and Latin 
American countries grow less rapidly—as they have been doing recently, the regressions 
suggest rather strongly that it must have something to do with the origin of their legal 
systems. Mahoney attacked the issue of African and Latin American countries’ poor 
showing by including dummy variables for both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
                                                 
25. In fact, large bodies of American common law have been replaced by statues (Cross 2005 at n. 
116–119). 
26. Pagano and Volpin (2005, p. 1006) 
27. La Porta and others (2000, p. 16).  
28. La Porta and others (2000, p. 20); see also, La Porta and others (2002, pp. 1148–49).  
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and found that common law countries still grew faster but to a lesser extent and with 
lower statistical significance, suggesting that the LLSV results on legal origin are a less 
important predictor of economic growth than might otherwise have been thought.30  
Nearly a century later, in 1900, Germany adopted its own distinctive civil and 
commercial codes. Those codes became the base not just for German-speaking Austria 
and multilingual Switzerland but also the point of origin for the codes in Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan; these countries have been growing more rapidly than most of the rest 
of the developing world, thereby, according to a common intuition, supporting the view 
that German law is superior to French law for developing countries. (We can ignore the 
Scandinavian countries, since their few colonies are not developing countries today, and 
so the Scandinavians influenced only each other.) Meanwhile, the common law countries, 
such as the United States, Canada, and Australia have flourished, even if the overall 
results in terms of growth are weighed down by the Kenyas and Zimbabwes of the 
world—common law countries in terms of “legal origin.” One can thus see a certain 
intuitive plausibility that noneconomists quickly came to attach to the LLSV regression 
results. 
All of this work on legal origins was based on cross-country regressions with only 
the most general comparative law analysis. Nonetheless, the legal origins literature set 
forth legal and institutional hypotheses that, coupled with economic studies on the 
contribution of financial development to economic growth, have been taken by many 
scholars and policymakers as the reason why common law countries grow faster than 
civil law countries. These hypotheses, including the supposedly uncontroversial 
classification of countries by legal origin, are examined at length in this book. The choice 
of indicators of what substantive law provisions constitute superior protection of 
shareholders and creditors are examined in Part III on the financial Sector. As shown in 
later discussions, the LLSV choice of indicators and their interpretation of those 
indicators is a weak element of their legal origin work. 
In the many economic articles, by LLSV and others, there is a broad recognition 
that the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property is vital to financial 
development. Although finance is an ideal sector to demonstrate this point, especially 
                                                                                                                                                 
29. Mahoney (2001, p. 516, table 2). 
30. Mahoney (2001, p. 517, table 3). 
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because the profusion of data lends itself to econometric methods of proof, it can hardly 
be doubted that the same principle should apply outside the financial area. After all, 
economies are more than finance, even if the concept of finance is interpreted broadly to 
include corporate governance; in the real economy, as opposed to the financial, the same 
principles should apply. One of the many legal areas outside financial markets where 
legal origin should therefore be important, but is much less studied in cross-country 
regressions, is the real estate sector. It is examined in a chapter on land in Part II . This is 
a particularly important sector in many developing countries where more than half the 
population works in the agricultural sector and where the growth of megacities has made 
security of urban real estate, and underlying concepts of title and registry, particularly 
important. 
Although the legal origins literature is focused on financial markets, and 
especially on substantive legal rules concerning shareholder and creditor protection, 
LLSV do recognize, as noted above, that enforcement of the rules, and hence the role of 
the judiciary, is important. Their approach to using legal origin to study these issues is 
also discussed in Part II in a chapter on the judiciary. Obviously the judiciary has a role 
transcending the financial sector.  
 Before reaching these nonfinancial applications of the legal origins analysis, quite 
a number of issues about the entire legal origins approach need to be fleshed out. The rest 
of this chapter is devoted to those questions, and the following chapters ask what history 
can teach about the role of legal institutions in the development of economies. 
 
Preliminary Questions 
 Although my focus on the legal origins literature is not on the authors’ 
regressions as such, I nevertheless raise some preliminary questions about the data on 
which the regressions are based. These questions are offered as a basis for raising more 
fundamental questions about the legal and policy implications for economic development 
and to suggest several lines of inquiry for a more qualitative analysis.  
What is it about law that makes its origin important? Why should law play an 
important role in economic development, and therefore what differences in legal systems 
make a difference in rates of economic development? Many alternative qualitative 
questions spring quickly to mind, and in fact the economists who have conducted these 
Legal Institutions 
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studies have not been shy about suggesting answers to these and similar questions even 
though their answers do not flow, strictly speaking, from their econometric work. Rather 
their answers are derived from their understanding of legal institutions, for which they 
usually cite a few legal surveys, particularly in the field of comparative law. 
Whatever the methodology and the results of cross-country statistical studies, a 
lawyer is left with a preliminary question: Why should a common law system be superior 
to a civil law system. American legal scholars have not been shy about offering 
suggestions as to the best answer, and the American legal literature is impressively large 
on the subject.  Mostly the proffered explanations have to do with the supposed 
advantages of reasoning from case to case, but there is little agreement among the authors 
of the essays. The reasoning, much of which suggests analogies of the case law system to 
Darwinian natural selection with good precedents replacing bad precedents, largely 
ignores two crucial points: First, most law today, especially that involving the economy, 
is statutory in both common law and civil law countries. And second, civil law countries 
have extensive bodies of case law.31 
Cross, in a thorough review of the arguments, came to the conclusion that 
whatever differences there may once have been between common law and civil law 
systems, “it would be surprising to see a remarkable effect from the nation’s choice of 
common or civil law [and], surely, the convergence between the approaches would have 
at least muted the effect of the distinct systems.”32 Cross does find a possible difference 
based on a greater independence of the judiciary in common law systems. In this respect, 
Cross follows in the footsteps of Mahoney, whose work was briefly reviewed earlier in 
this chapter. Cross, however, is relying on a perception of judicial independence based on 
a World Economic Forum survey. His conclusion underscores again the greater 
importance of public law than private law in investigating legal origins.  
 The policy “take away” for developing countries from the Cross review is thus the 
need to focus on how a judiciary can be made more independent constitutionally and how 
judges can be enabled and encouraged to behave more independently.33 
 
                                                 
31 Cross (2005). 
32 Cross (2005 at notes 125-126). 
33 See “The Judiciary and Economic Development,” U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper 
No. 287. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=892030. 
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Another preliminary question is what the policy implications of the legal origins 
research  are for economic development? If legal origin does in fact make a decisive 
difference in economic growth, what policies should policymakers in the developed 
country foreign aid agencies, in the international financial institutions and, above all, in 
third world governments adopt?  
No one would suggest, to take an extreme example, that Latin American countries 
should simply adopt U.S. or English law and legal institutions from one day to the next. 
Indeed, even if such adoption were possible, it would take perhaps two generations 
before one could reasonably expect Latin American law and legal institutions to function 
like those in the United States or England.  Even assuming that culture, social norms, 
and history have little role in the functioning of a legal system, a time lag would occur for 
the simple fact that a legal system works through a legal profession and a judiciary. Even 
if law faculties could be changed overnight to meet their new function, it would still take 
two generations before the leaders of the profession and the senior judges trained in the 
old system would be replaced by those trained in a common law system.  
 This realistic view of how law evolves does not mean that no changes are possible 
in a shorter run. Quite the contrary, much of the burden of my argument is that the many 
changes of the past several decades, both in market economy developing countries and in 
communist countries transitioning to a market economy, offer quite a good deal of 
experience in what works and what does not work. Moreover, these experiences do not 
need to be discussed in the abstract but can be examined in specific fields of law. For 
example, following the popular “sloganized” definition of the rule of law, one can look at 
the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property rights. One can look at 
specific areas where law affects the economy in a powerful way—land law, corporate 
law, bankruptcy law, and the like. And especially one can look at the role of law and 
legal institutions in financial markets, where the legal origins research focuses.  
 Any inquiry into policy implications has to go beyond regression results to the 
underlying mechanisms through which the law, the judiciary, and the legal profession 
influence the economy. Therefore, it is worth deepening the understanding of the possible 
role of legal origins in economic development. One way of doing so is to look at some of 
the factual anomalies in the studies and then to look for alternative explanations of 
differential rates of economic growth. But the reader should be aware that the purpose of 
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such an examination is not to reach some final conclusion as to the validity of legal 
origins theory but rather to use the examination as an entry point to a deeper 
consideration of the relationship between legal institutions and economic development.  
 
Some Anomalies 
 The legal origins literature does not purport to be a study of economic 
development. It treats developed countries and developing countries alike and simply 
asks whether certain origins are better for certain purposes. In the key legal origins 
article, all forty-nine countries, developed or developing, are treated as equal, including 
the origin countries themselves, and no consideration is given to the size of the 
population or to the geographical region.34 The central inquiry is to determine which 
legal families have the best substantive law for financial development, using substantive 
legal criteria determined by the authors. 
 On the few occasions when the authors attempt to determine whether the 
countries differ based on their per capita income levels, they come to some surprising 
results. As is spelled out in a later chapter, where the legal origins authors choose to 
categorize countries by their stage of development, the startling result is that the poorest 
one-third of countries have better substantive law than the richest one-third by the 
authors’ own definition of the crucial substantive law rules!35 
Even among developed countries there are some oddities if one were to interpret 
the legal origins literature as directly relevant to economic growth. One might suppose on 
a casual reading that Britain, the source of the common law, has a better growth story to 
tell than France, which provided what the legal origins literature says is the worst legal 
origin. Nothing could be further from the truth. Taking the period from 1820 to 1998 as a 
whole, France outpaced Britain in the rate of per capita growth. A study by Maddison 
showed, moreover, that this was true from 1820 to 1913 (France had an annual average 
compound growth rate of 1.13 percent versus 0.96 for Britain), 1913 to 1950 (1.12 
percent to 0.80 percent), and 1950 to 1998 (2.77 percent to 2.10 percent).36 An appendix 
                                                 
34. La Porta and others (1998).  
35. See discussion in Kenneth W. Dam, Credit Markets, Creditors' Rights and Economic 
Development, U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 281, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=885198 . 
36. Maddison (2001, p. 90, table 2-22a).  
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to Maddison’s study, however, tells a more nuanced tale: breaking the time periods 
differently, the data shows that from 1820 to 1870 Britain outpaced France, as it did 
again from 1973 to 1998.37 Still, for the entire period, France came out ahead.  
In fact, from 1870 to 1976 Britain grew only fourfold whereas an arithmetical 
average of sixteen “advanced countries” grew sixfold, stimulating a leading British 
financial journalist, Samuel Brittan, to note that the “lag in British growth rates goes back 
at least a century.”38 Of course, Brittan wrote in 1978, before the privatization and 
deregulation that began in the Thatcher period and was in place thereafter. One therefore 
might say that the reason Britain outperformed France in more recent years has more to 
do with those microeconomic policy initiatives than with any superiority of common law 
over French law.  In 1979, the year Margaret Thatcher became prime minister, French 
per capita income was $14,970, compared with  $13,164 in the United Kingdom (a 
difference of $1,806, or about 12 percent). In 2001 France was still ahead at $21,092, 
compared with the United Kingdom at $20,127 (a difference reduced to $965 and less 
than 5 percent).39 
Consider, moreover, that throughout the nineteenth century French per capita 
income had been much lower than British per capita income, but despite two world wars 
fought on French territory, by the late 1960s French per capita income was able to pull 
ahead.40 Hence, if one looks at developments from the beginning of modern financial 
development in the mid-nineteenth century to the beginnings of Thatcherite reform, one 
would conclude that the French legal system is superior to the British legal system for 
economic growth. 
Perhaps with this economic record in mind, Merryman wrote an astute article in 
1996, before the legal origin literature appeared, advancing the thesis that French law 
may be fine for France but is unsatisfactory for former French colonies.41 His reasoning 
reflects the importance of separating substantive rules of law from questions of 
enforcement, as well as of taking a realistic view of how judicial enforcement actually 
                                                 
37. Maddison (2001, p. 186, appendix table A1-d). 
38. Brittan (1978, p. 246).  
39. Maddison (2001, pp. 276–77, table C1-c).  
40. Maddison (2002, pp. 62–65, table 1c). For a detailed argument that any superiority of financial 
development in common law countries over civil law countries is to be explained by twentieth century 
economic destruction and national occupations rather than legal origins, see Roe (2006).  
41. Merryman (1996).  
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operates. Noting that the most important aspect of the Napoleonic legal revolution was to 
limit the power of judges and particularly their ability to “make law,” he pointed out that 
limiting the role of judges to make law by interpreting ambiguities in statutes was quickly 
perceived to be impracticable and that a number of fields of French law are in fact 
principally judge made. As Jolowicz explains, in France: 
Development of law through judicial decisions, though not altogether new, 
came to be openly recognised as a fact by all except, of course, the Judges 
themselves when they came to give the formal reasons for their decisions. 
No one denies today, either for France or for Germany, that great areas of 
the law are in truth the products of the courts; if any common lawyer still 
supposes that for the civil law systems case law does not exist, a glance at 
any Continental textbook with its wealth of case citations will quickly 
convince him of his error.42  
Merryman, in his critique, went on to contrast French law in France with French 
law in former colonies, arguing that when other countries adopted French law, they were 
not so practical: 
The attempt to depict the judicial function as something narrow, 
mechanical and uncreative and to portray judges as clerks … has had a 
self-fulfilling effect. Judges are at the bottom of the scale of prestige 
among the legal professions in France and in the many nations that 
adopted the French Revolutionary reforms, and the best people in those 
nations accordingly seek other legal careers. One result has been to cripple 
the judicial systems in a number of developing countries. In France, where 
everyone knows how to do what needs to be done behind the separation of 
powers façade, misrepresentation of the judicial function does not have 
severe consequences. But when the French exported their system they did 
not include the information that it really does not work that way, and they 
failed to include a blueprint of how it actually does work. That has 
created, and continues to create, problems in nations with limited legal 
infrastructures and fragile legal systems….43 The point that enforcement 
                                                 
42. Jolowicz (1982, p. 93).  
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is more important than the substantive rules of law is one that recurs 
throughout this book, but for now the important point is that the legal 
origins literature indirectly maligns the French legal system even as it 
actually operates in France, and it tends to lead the casual reader of that 
literature to erroneous conclusions about the rule-of-law challenges facing 
the developing world. 
 
Factual Anomalies 
 Once one goes into the details of the legal origins literature, some important 
factual anomalies also emerge. Two stand out. The first is that, at least in the early 
studies, the focus was heavily on private law—especially corporate and commercial 
law—rather than what might seem far more important to economic growth, namely, 
public law—that is, constitutional law bearing on the powers of the government, 
administrative law bearing on the powers of the bureaucracy, regulatory law bearing on 
the way in which the government regulates business, and the like.44 As Schlesinger and 
his comparative law colleagues stated: “The economic and social changes which have 
taken place during the [twentieth] century … mostly are reflected in the growth of such 
public law fields as administrative law, labor law, social security, taxation, 
nationalization, and public corporations. Many of these changes, therefore, are only 
faintly reflected on the face of the modern private law codes.”45  
It is important to understand that the French and German civil codes dealt with 
private law, as opposed to public law. Indeed, those two civil codes are primarily 
concerned with what are referred to in common law circles as contracts, torts, property, 
family law, and inheritance. Because its focus is on the financial sector, much of the legal 
origins literature has to do with corporate and commercial law, which is found largely in 
the French and German commercial codes. Neither the civil nor the commercial codes 
have much at all to do, especially today, with the relationship between the state and the 
                                                 
44. See, however, Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development, U. Chicago Law & 
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 287, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=892030 , for an 
analysis of an important article on judicial checks and balances; three of four authors were LLSV authors. 
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de-Silanes and Shleifer 2006). 
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individual citizen or enterprise. This is not to say that the details of corporate and 
commercial law are not important to economic growth; on the contrary, their importance 
is stressed in later chapters. But they are arguably less important to the concept of the 
rule of law, which in the economic sphere has much to do with the protection of property 
rights and the enforcement of contracts. Lack of enforcement of property rights in the 
developing world has more to do with public law than with private law. The biggest 
threats to property rights are the state itself and favoritism toward friends of the 
government. Difficulties in enforcing contracts do not normally arise from weaknesses in 
substantive law. 
 
The Coding Question: The Latin American Example 
 A second anomaly is that in the process of applying regression analysis—the 
coding of particular third world countries as, say, French law countries—is quite an 
oversimplification. 46  To see this point most easily, one has only to consider Latin 
America, which represents more than 40 percent of the French civil law countries in the 
LLSV legal origins database.47 
First of all, Spain did not adopt its civil code until 1889, and until that time its 
private law was based on Roman law (although it did adopt a commercial code applicable 
to merchants’ transactions in 1829). Hence, the law of property and contracts in Spanish- 
and Portuguese-speaking Latin America (not only during the colonial period but also 
during the years when the newly independent countries were establishing their legal 
systems) was based on Roman law—which is exactly what the French civil code system 
was intended to replace.48 Even after 1889 the Spanish Civil Code followed the French 
Civil Code only in the law of obligations (roughly, contracts and torts). In other words, 
well after the legal die had been cast in most of Latin America, the Spanish Civil Code  
codified indigenous Spanish rules, especially in family law and inheritance. While those 
legal areas are arguably not crucial for commercial growth, those countries maintained 
the family law and inheritance rules that kept together the traditional great families with 
                                                 
46. The authors recognized that their reliance on a standard legal source led to difficulties in some 
countries, but apparently the requirements of regression studies—necessitating that each country be 
assigned one and only one legal origin—required the oversimplification. See La Porta and others (1997, p. 
1138, table II).  
47. For similar points about other regions of the world, see Siems (2006). 
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their vast estates and hence may not have been the best model for economic development 
in Latin America.49 
Thus the Latin American codes in force today, while indisputably based on a civil 
law rather than a common law approach, certainly did not follow the French Civil Code 
down the line. As the president of the Spanish Supreme Court, seeing as many Spanish 
and Portuguese elements as French elements in Latin American law, observed: 
The influences that have acted on the law of the countries of Iberic origin 
have been many and varied, but they have not been able to erase its own 
and original characteristics nor blot out the Spanish origin. It is a mistake 
to include in the French group, as many times has been done, such Iberic-
American legislations as Chile, Peru, Argentine, Colombia, Brazil, 
Venezuela and Mexico, just because in these civil codes of these, and the 
other American countries, there can be seen directives and norms that 
come from the French Civil Code, because they are also influenced by the 
Spanish, the Portuguese, and the Italian laws, and even by the German and 
Swiss Codes.50  
Take Mexico as an example: According to its code commission, the 1871 
Mexican Civil Code was based on, “principles of Roman law, our own [Mexican] 
complicated legislation, the codes of France, Sardinia, Austria, [and] Portugal … in 
addition to past drafts completed in Mexico and Spain.”51 In the area of commercial 
codes, one finds that until 1884 Mexican bankruptcy law was based on the 1737 
Ordenanzas of Bilbao. From 1890 to 1943 the source of Mexican bankruptcy law was the 
1829 Spanish commercial code. And even the 1943 Mexican bankruptcy law was drafted 
by a Spanish lawyer; it was based on Spanish law and on a 1665 Spanish book, although 
for the first time “Italian and French influences” could be found in Mexican bankruptcy 
law.52 Yet Mexico is unambiguously coded as being of French legal origin with respect 
to bankruptcy law.  
As for Brazil, Zweigert and Kötz explain: “In addition to the Code civil [of 
                                                                                                                                                 
48. Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003b, p. 180).  
49. Mirow (2004, pp. 150–54).  
50. Castan Tobeñas (1988, pp. 105, 140).  
51. Quoted in Merryman, Clark, and Haley (1994, p. 467).  
52. American Law Institute (2003, pp. 21–23). 
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France] it [Brazil] was able to draw on the Portuguese and Italian codes, as well as those 
of Germany and Switzerland. The structure of the Code, especially its ‘General Part,’ is 
largely traceable to German influence.”53  
The case of the Chilean civil code of 1857 is perhaps the most instructive, 
because it was subsequently adopted in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela and was the main source for the civil codes of 
Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The draftsman of the Chilean civil code, 
Andrés Bello, was born in Caracas in 1781 and lived in England from 1810 to 1829, 
when among other things he worked on the papers of Jeremy Bentham. After moving to 
Chile in 1829, he taught Roman law and became a citizen and a senator in Chile. His 
code “successfully wove together modern European codes, particularly the French Civil 
Code of 1804 (the Code Napoleon), the medieval Spanish law of the Siete Partidas, and 
Roman law…. Numerous factors played into Bello’s construction of the code, including 
the works of von Savigny [German], the French commentators on the civil law and the 
French civil code, the writings of Jeremy Bentham, and various European codes of civil 
law.”54  
The story of the civil code of Argentina is essentially similar, except that the 
draftsman’s name was Ocampo rather than Bello. Ocampo was an Argentine, who had 
studied law in Spain and later taught law in Chile. In addition to  colonial Spanish law 
and the Ordenanzas de Bilbao, he based the Argentine commercial code on “the 
commercial codes of France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Brazil, and Wurtenberg, as well 
as many treatises on commercial law.”55   
However one characterizes the origins of Latin American private law, it is 
certainly true that in recent decades North American influence on private law has grown. 
The Anglo-Saxon device of the trust has taken deep root in Latin America.56 Usually 
used for family financial matters, the trust also has found abundant use in secured lending 
and corporate finance in the United States and potentially therefore is of considerable 
relevance, particularly in the financial sector, for those many Latin American countries 
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that have imported this legal device.57 As Mattei has commented: 
It is no wonder therefore that, despite the very peculiar institutional 
background in which the [English and American] law of trust has 
developed, as soon as its potential became clear to the economic and legal 
community, this institution became very fashionable…. Many South 
American civilian systems have adopted the institution of trust by 
legislation …. [The] trust has obtained an easy and well-deserved victory 
in the competition in the market of legal ideas.58 
 In the area of public regulation of corporate transactions, U.S. notions of 
securities regulation have been important influences on the financial sector, starting with 
Mexico’s legislation in 1953 based on the U.S. securities legislation.59 But even much 
earlier than this, Latin American had been heavily influenced by U.S. and British law and 
practice, whatever the underlying commercial codes might provide.60 
Sometimes these two anomalies—the emphasis on private law (civil and 
commercial) and the multiple origins of particular third world countries’ law—interact. 
As we have seen, the coding of the Law and Finance studies somewhat misrepresents the 
private law legal heritage in some important countries, and it certainly is based on a 
misconception when it comes to public law. 
 
Legal Origins and Public Law 
 In Latin America there are two major public law influences, one from the United 
States and one from the Iberian peninsula. Indeed, certain characteristics of Latin 
American public law are special to the area, perhaps best explained as products of the 
history of the region. 
The first and perhaps predominant influence on Latin American constitutions is 
the U.S. Constitution, which was certainly more important than the successive French 
constitutions. As Schlesinger and his colleagues noted: “Yet, common law ideas 
(especially the elements of common law entrenched in the U.S. Constitution) have had a 
considerable impact on Latin American legal systems, primarily in the area of public law. 
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The notions of due process and habeas corpus, for example, have been incorporated into 
the constitutions and statutes of a number of Latin American nations.”61 Merryman, 
Clark, and Haley put it this way:  
In the structure of the various branches of government, in the idea of the 
nature and function of a constitution, in the approach to review of the 
legality of legislative, administrative, and judicial action, Latin America 
was strongly affected by the United States model. This feature of Latin 
American legal systems can be simply, with only partial accuracy, 
summarized by saying that Latin American public law is more North 
American than European in character.62  
A second influence comes from the Iberian peninsula rather than France. Spain 
and Portugal were authoritarian countries, both during the period before the nineteenth 
century Latin American revolutions that created the present-day nation states and 
throughout the period of initial constitution writing, and even well into the second half of 
the twentieth century. In Wiarda and Klein’s view: 
Political theory in Iberia and Latin America, in contrast, views 
government as good, natural, and necessary for the welfare of society. If 
government is good, there was little reason to limit or put checks and 
balances on it. Hence, before we fall into the trap of condemning Latin 
America for its powerful autocratic executives, subservient parliaments, 
and weak local government, we must remember the different assumptions 
on which the Latin American systems are based.63 
Douglass North emphasized the influence of European ideas, probably more Iberian than 
French, that shaped nineteenth century Latin America and were carried over into the 
twentieth century—“a long heritage of centralized bureaucratic controls and 
accompanying ideological perceptions of the issues.”64 The results were unfortunate. In 
Mexico, “centralized, bureaucratic traditions carried over from its Spanish/Portuguese 
heritage” were “perpetuated.” North wrote: 
The interventionist and pervasively arbitrary nature of the institutional 
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environment forced every enterprise, urban or rural, to operate in a highly 
politicized manner, using kinship networks, political influence, and family 
prestige to gain privileged access to subsidized credit, to aid various 
stratagems for recruiting labor, to collect debts or enforce contracts, to 
evade taxes or circumvent the courts, and to defend or assert titles to 
lands. Success or failure in the economic arena always depended on the 
relationship of the producer with political authorities—local officials for 
arranging matters close at hand and the central government of the colony 
for sympathetic interpretations of the law and intervention at the local 
level when conditions required it. Small enterprise, excluded from the 
system of corporate privilege and political favors, was forced to operate in 
a permanent state of semiclandestiny, always at the margin of the law, at 
the mercy of petty officials, never secure from arbitrary acts and never 
protected against the rights of those more powerful.65 
 From the standpoint of enforcement of contracts and protection of property, these 
nineteenth century conditions of governance in Latin America have little to do with the 
French tradition of a strong bureaucratic state or with the principles of the Code 
Napoleon. The constitutional structure of France coming out of the French Revolution 
was far from devoted to perpetuating the power of local economic and social interests. 
The new French constitutional arrangements were based on the sovereignty of the 
legislative branch. Indeed, that was the central theory of French constitutional theory 
until De Gaulle came to power in 1958, when the French constitution was amended. This 
amendment was a condition of his willingness to assume the helm of the French state. 
The new 1958 French constitution granted the executive the power to make law in certain 
areas by decree.  
 
Yet the theory of Latin American constitutions has traditionally been the opposite 
of the pre-1958 French constitution; these Latin American constitutions granted great 
power to the executive. And, as North points out, Spain was the source of these Latin 
American institutions: “There was a centralized monarchy and bureaucracy in Castile, 
and it was Castile that defined the institutional evolution of both Spain and Latin 
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America.”66 As Wiarda and Klein further explain: 
“Virtually all Latin American constitutions have provided for the 
historical, three-part division of power among executive, legislature, and 
judiciary. However, in practice the been largely outside Latin American 
legal tradition.”67  
With regard to judicial review—that is, the power of the courts to declare acts of 
the legislature unconstitutional—it is quite wrong to code Latin American countries’ law 
as based on French law. Indeed, the institution of judicial review has recently become 
more common in Latin America. Yet in France, judicial review is not available at all, 
except in a special, essentially nonjudicial council in advance of enactment (and even that 
review became available only in 1958, many decades after judicial review became 
common in Latin America).68 
In the case of administrative law, while French law provides for acts of 
government administration to be reviewable, that review takes place only in specialized 
administrative courts and not in the regular judicial system (that is, administrative law is 
not reviewable by the ordinary courts that also handle cases among private parties).69 
Just the opposite is true in most of Latin America. Many Latin American countries have 
developed a remedy, usually called amparo (similar to but broader than the English and 
American writ of habeas corpus) that can be used to attack a broad range of 
administrative acts. In fact, unlike most European countries that allow administrative acts 
to be reviewable only by a specialized administrative court, amparo can normally be 
brought in the ordinary court system.70 One therefore could ask why Latin America is not 
coded for regression purposes in the same category as the United States, at least to the 
extent that the underlying theory of the rule of law in economic development depends on 
the relationship between the state and the economy. 
If one looks to legal culture, it may be the case that even in public law, the legal 
culture of many Latin American countries leads to different results in public law 
controversies than one would anticipate by looking only at the rules on the books. And it 
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may be that the Latin American legal culture in some way can be said to reflect a French 
approach to the legal profession and the judiciary. But a defense of the legal origins 
approach on this subtle ground merely leads to a second set of questions that may be the 
most important ones when one begins to look for policy implications for developing 
countries.71 
Still a different kind of anomaly arises from treating Anglo-Saxon countries as in 
the same box simply because they adopted the common law. Insofar as public law is 
concerned, one can ask—for example—why Britain and the United States should be 
placed together. As a continental European legal scholar puts it: “[I]t is clear enough that 
British and American constitutional law are not part of the same ‘family.’… For the study 
of public law … the idea of legal families does not work.”72  
While the reasoning of courts in both countries places more emphasis on judicial 
precedent than is normal in many civil law countries, Britain has never recognized 
judicial review of statutory enactments.73 Parliament is sovereign (just as the French 
Assembly is sovereign) and has been since the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. (Before 
1689 neither Parliament nor the king—the latter being generally recognized as 
sovereign—would recognize judicial review.74) As a matter of fact, Britain—unlike 
France, Germany, and nearly all other countries in the world—does not even have a 
written constitution. To the extent that Britain has a constitution—based on legislation 
and conventions and practice going back to Magna Carta—it is not just subject to many 
interpretations but is considered more a question for Parliament than for the courts. 
Indeed, Parliament can change the constitution by its enactments, just as it can change a 
statute, without any special constitutional amendment procedure.75  
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Governance as an Alternative Theory 
 The governance approach to explaining the rate of economic growth, though 
useful as a contrast to the legal origins literature, has in common with it the use of 
econometric techniques by economists. The governance work has been done largely by 
economists at the World Bank Institute, a research component of the World Bank. The 
original legal origins work, in contrast, was almost entirely the product of economists in 
academia, although some offshoots from it have been funded and extended by the World 
Bank. An important reason for the difference in where the work is done is probably that 
the governance work had to be preceded by the collection of a great deal of special 
survey data. The administration of the survey questionnaires involves more than 200 
countries, and their continuation year after year is obviously easier for an international 
organization than for academic researchers. 
 The governance work has several advantages over the legal origins literature in 
explaining comparative economic growth. The larger number of countries included 
allows many more interesting comparisons. Moreover, many more developing countries 
are included in the governance studies than were considered in the original Law and 
Finance literature. Especially noteworthy are the number of common and civil law 
countries in Africa, compared with the Law and Finance literature, which had no African 
civil law countries (other than Egypt, which is quite different in most respects from sub-
Saharan Africa). The governance indicators suggest some obvious and practical 
modifications to development strategy beyond the law on the books and especially 
beyond legal origin, which by definition cannot be changed. The amount of data collected 
over an eight-year period allows judgments about how changes in governance may have 
affected countries’ growth. Kaufmann noted, for example, that “a simple review of recent 
data suggests a much higher correlation between FDI [foreign direct investment] and 
governance than between FDI and macroeconomic variables,” leading  him to the 
conclusions that “maintaining macroeconomic stability ought to continue to be regarded 
as a necessary precondition for growth and for FDI, yet it is far from sufficient,” and that 
“particular emphasis on governance factors is warranted, since at the present juncture it 
appears to constitute a binding constraint.”76 
 Another important difference is that the governance inquiry has been much 
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broader than the legal origins approach. In the minds of the governance analysts, there 
are three dimensions of governance of a country, each of which is in turn broken down 
into six dimensions: “voice and external accountability;” “political stability and lack of 
violence, crime, and terrorism;” “government effectiveness;” “lack of regulatory burden 
[sometimes abbreviated as regulatory quality];” “rule of law;” and “control of 
corruption.”77 
 The core of the analysis in the succeeding chapters of this book is thus the fifth 
component, the rule of law, although elements of the other five components also play a 
role in some legal origins work. In turn, the governance research implicitly looks to 
factors other than legal origin, although it does provide some insight into the legal origins 
work product. 
 One aspect of the governance research is that it permits one to rank countries by 
“rule of law” and, to the extent that the research results are based on surveys, to chart 
progress between compilations of the surveys, not just for countries but for regions of the 
world. So, for example, the surveys provide quantitative evidence of what one normally 
finds in qualitative writing, such as the extent to which judicial independence varies by 
region. The surveys show that judicial independence is greater among the members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) than in the East Asia 
industrialized countries, which in turn rank higher than the transition countries (Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union), with emerging market countries slightly lower than 
the transition countries. The surveys also show that the Eastern European countries have 
done much better in judicial independence than the countries of the former Soviet 
Union.78  
Looking at changes fromf one compilation to the next, one finds the less obvious 
and more worrisome fact that, from 1998 to 2003, judicial independence deteriorated 
slightly in all regions (other than the East Asian industrialized countries).79 And still 
more interesting, judicial independence is no higher in Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s emerging countries than it is in Eastern Europe’s transition countries, despite 
                                                                                                                                                 
76. Kaufmann (2004, p. 139).  
77. Kaufmann (2004, p. 142). 
78. Kaufmann (2004, p. 143, table 1).   
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the pernicious influence of Communist parties on judicial independence until the early 
1990s.80  
Similarly worrisome is the major deterioration experienced by low-income 
countries in all six governance dimensions from 1996 to 2003. A number of low-income 
African countries,  such as the Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe 
suffered “significant” deterioration in all six categories, including the rule of law. In 
contrast, some low-income countries made significant improvements in five or six 
categories, showing that improvement even in the lowest-income countries is definitely 
possible.  
Another insight comes from survey questions such as, “In your industry, how 
commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes 
connected with influencing laws and policies, regulations, or decrees to favor selected 
business interests?” (with seven possible answers ranging from “common” to “never 
occurs”).81 Of course, surveys depend on questions, and it is common knowledge that 
different individuals interpret questions differently, and that this is especially true with 
regard to individuals in different countries. For example, some individuals, and probably 
even more so some cultures, tend to be more pessimistic than others about the state of 
values of other people and hence are inclined to assume that corruption is more common 
among other firms than perhaps is warranted. A comparable reservation about 
comparisons with regard to judicial independence is prudent. Trends over time within 
regions, and especially within countries, may thus be more important than cross-country 
and especially cross-regional comparisons. Still, the general cross-regional results from 
the surveys support, rather than contradict, judgments commonly expressed in qualitative 
commentary. 
The findings showing sharp differences between developed and developing 
countries on rule-of-law issues raise the same problem that plagues the legal origin 
studies, namely, the direction of causality. Do more independent legal institutions cause 
higher incomes? Or is it a case of reverse causality? In other words, do higher incomes 
                                                                                                                                                 
79. Although one may have statistical doubts about whether a deterioration has been conclusively 
shown, Kaufmann (2004, p. 139 n. 8) points out that the “statistical confidence in the statement that there is 
no evidence of a positive trend in any governance dimension is very high.”  
80. Kaufmann (2004, p. 140, figure 1b).  
81. Kaufmann (2004, p. 160, table A2). 
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provide the resources that lead to a higher rule-of-law level? One can see, for example, 
that with more money, judges can be paid more and be provided with more computers 
and better libraries, thereby insulating them better against political pressures and the 
temptation of bribes. 
In dealing with the issue of reverse causality, legal origins studies can rely on the 
analytical point that because the legal origin of a country was determined more than a 
century earlier, the country’s current income level cannot determine its legal origin.82 
Governance studies have no such recourse. However, governance researchers have used a 
different approach that allows them, in their judgment, to find not just that there was no 
reverse causality but “a large direct causal effect from better governance to improved 
development outcomes.”83 
The governance literature provides a platform for evaluating the legal origins 
literature. Specifically, the governance surveys, together with expert assessments from a 
wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental groups, provide country-by-country 
data on the state of the current rule of law. These country results can  then be run back to 
see how different origins rank on the rule-of-law criterion. This cross-methodology 
exercise does find, “controlling for other factors, on average a small advantage for 
countries with common law over civil law origins.”84 But it also raises a number of 
reservations about the utility for public policy of the common law–civil law distinction. If 
one divides  countries into two categories, high-quality and low-quality rule of law, one 
can further sort  by legal origin and current income levels and then can see how many of 
the civil law developing countries actually enjoy high-quality rule of law and how many 
of the common law developing countries suffer from low-quality rule of law. French law 
countries include, for example, Chile and Costa Rica, countries that are usually 
considered to rank relatively high on rule of law. And the common law countries include 
many lower-quality rule-of-law countries, not just in Africa (such as Kenya, Liberia, 
Nigeria, and Somalia) but also in Asia (Bangladesh and Pakistan). German law is not 
found to any great extent in the developing world because of the lateness and weakness 
of German colonial expansion, but it includes high-quality rule-of-law countries such as 
                                                 
82. See La Porta and others (1998, pp. 1150–52) on the use of instrumental variables. 
83. The World Bank Institute approach to reverse causality is explained in Kaufmann (2004, p. 145). 
84. Kaufmann (2004, p. 147). 
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Korea and Taiwan in Asia and Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia in Eastern Europe.85  
A further virtue of the governance literature is that it includes some two hundred 
countries, whereas the key Law and Finance article included data on only forty-nine 
countries. Although forty-nine countries may be enough for an academic paper aimed at a 
general conclusion (and at the time a new perspective), serious problems arise when one 
is attempting to arrive at policy recommendations for a subset of those countries—
namely, developing countries.86  Then questions about the selection criteria  become 
important. The governance literature uses data from essentially all developing countries. 
Furthermore, the difference by legal origin among the governance literature’s 
seventy-five low-income countries (which are especially important for economic 
development policy) provides a common law–civil law comparison on governance 
indicators as a whole (that is, all six dimensions and not just the rule-of-law dimension). 
The results show, for example, that in those countries, common law countries come out 
slightly ahead of civil law countries on three components (voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, and rule of law); even with civil law countries on regulatory 
quality; and  slightly behind civil law countries on political stability and control of 
corruption.87 From this perspective, the public policy problem to be addressed in low-
income countries is governance across the board and not just the legal origin aspects of 
governance. 
Even with respect to legal origin as such, Kaufman found that while there was, 
“evidence of a small but significant correlation between legal origins and governance” in 
the complete set of some two hundred countries, when he focused on the seventy-five 
lower-income countries, “the differences between common law and civil law essentially 
                                                 
85. Kaufmann (2004, p. 147).  
86. The LLSV (La Porta and others 1998, p. 1117) criteria for inclusion required that the country have 
at least five domestic, nonfinancial, publicly traded firms with no government ownership in 1993. These 
criteria made sense for a study of the development of financial sectors without special focus on special 
issues involving developing countries but left out information that would be important if one were 
primarily interested in developing countries. The legal origins authors have somewhat increased the 
number of countries in their database over time; see, for example, Djankov and others (2005), in which 
seventy-two countries are used. But the LLSV Law and Finance database remains much smaller than 
Kaufmann’s governance database. Some of the legal origins authors, particularly Djankov, who did not 
participate in the original Law and Finance studies, have participated in the World Bank Doing Business 
series, but that series is focused on regulatory issues that are beyond the scope of this book. Some of the 
LLSV author’s later work uses larger data sets to analyze other issues. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-
Eleches, and Shleifer (2004); La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006). 
87. Kaufmann (2004, p. 148, figure 3b).  
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disappear.” Yet, as Kaufmann points out, it “is precisely within this group of countries, 
many of which exhibit dysfunctional governance, that the most daunting governance 
challenges lie.”88 In short, the concept of legal origins is interesting from a scholarly 
point of view, but from the point of view of public policy formation for the poorer 
developing countries, legal origin appears to be of dubious relevance. 
In trying to understand these governance results, one must consider subjectivity 
and related survey issues. Kaufmann’s answer to the subjectivity concern is that 
subjective measures of governance contain important information often not captured by 
objective indicators, particularly in emerging economies.89  This answer is no doubt 
correct in view of the serious shortcomings of the LLSV “objective” indicators reviewed 
in this and later financial sector chapters, but there is still reason to consider the 
shortcomings of subjective measures. 
For example, a judicial corruption question was: “In your industry, how 
commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes 
connected with getting favorable judicial decisions?” A score of 1 means “common” and 
a score of 7 means “never.”90 Here, as in the legal origins work, policy implication issues 
arise: Bribes have both a supply and a demand side, and the research gives little insight 
into how to work to lower the incidence of judicial corruption. Especially when one is 
talking about judicial corruption, it is unclear how enforcement of anticorruption 
legislation can be achieved in those countries where it is most needed. 
 In the case of judicial independence, the respondents were asked to what extent 
they agreed with the following statement: “The judiciary in your country is independent 
from political influence of members of government, citizens, or firms.”91 These types of 
questions were asked of six thousand enterprises in more than one hundred countries, and 
therefore the answers are primarily a business view of the judiciary, which is certainly 
not the only view that counts and perhaps not even the most important one. 
One therefore might be inclined to object that perceptions do not necessarily 
                                                 
88. Kaufmann (2004, p. 147). See also Kaufmann (2003).  
89. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005).  
90. Kaufmann (2004, p. 141, figure 1c). 
91. Kaufmann (2004, p. 140, figure 1b). 
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reflect reality, and to some extent that is no doubt true.92 But perceptions can have 
independent force. If business firms believe that the courts are not independent, they are 
likely to make less use of the judiciary to resolve disputes. And if the dispute is with a 
governmental institution, they may be more likely to choose bribery as less expensive 
and more certain than litigation.  
Although one might quarrel with the choice of business respondents, an important 
by-product of focusing on business perceptions is that Kaufmann and colleagues were 
able to construct an index of “crony bias”—defined as the business respondents’ 
assessment of the special influence of firms close to the government as compared with 
the influence of their own trade association. Among the nonobvious results was that 
crony bias was substantially higher in Latin America than in the sub-Saharan Africa and 
the Middle East–North Africa regions.93 
What should one conclude to be the relative merits of the legal origin and 
governance approaches? The governance work suggests that the public policy 
implications in the rule-of-law area are complicated and that rule-of-law performance 
may well depend on institutions and organizations unrelated to the law; voice and 
accountability seem particularly important and can be influenced by legal rules, such as a 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press. But at least one can say that 
while legal origin cannot be changed, the governance work adds greatly to our 
understanding of what rule-of-law problems need to be worked on in the developing 
world whatever the legal origin of the countries involved. 
                                                 
92. K. Davis (2004, p. 150), who provides a critical review of efforts to assess the rule of law in 
developing countries, has pointed out that some business respondents in surveys may not have been 
residents of the country in question and therefore their perceptions may not have been based on personal 
and direct knowledge.   
93. See Hellman and Kaufmann (2002).  
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